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ABSTRACT
Memories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but
recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments
examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behaviour. In Experiment 1,
we challenged participants’ beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected
subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited
using the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants’ belief in true and
false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found
that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were
solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used
except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after
the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted
in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an
important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed
problem-solving.
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Jack has a memory in which he put his hand in a cage at the
Philadelphia Zoo and his left wrist was bitten by a monkey.
Years later, his mother assured him that it never happened.
He does not believe the horrible event actually happened,
but he cannot stophaving vivid “recollections”or “memories”
concerning the event (http://www.falsememoryarchive.com/).
The question is, when Jack comes across monkeys in the
zoo, will he stay away from them?
Memories of events for which the belief in the occur-
rence of those events has been undermined, but the recol-
lection has been preserved, are called nonbelieved
memories (NBMs). This recently studied phenomenon
turns out not to be rare, with more than 20% of people
reporting that they have vivid but nonbelieved autobiogra-
phical memories (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010). A lin-
gering question is whether these NBMs have any impact on
behaviour (e.g., avoiding monkeys). The current exper-
iments delve into this question by examining the (in)depen-
dent behavioural consequences of beliefs and recollections
on performance on subsequent problem-solving tasks.
Previous research on the behavioural consequences of
memories has predominantly focused on believed mem-
ories (Scoboria et al., 2014), with few studies looking at
the behavioural consequences of NBMs. An important
reason why we focus on the behavioural consequences
of NBMs is that there is a new line of research that has
demonstrated that belief and recollection are independent
constructs that can have differential effects on behaviour
(Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004; Scoboria, Talar-
ico, & Pascal, 2015). Here, belief refers to the truth value
related to the occurrence of an event, whether or not a
recollection is present. Recollection refers to the mental
re-experiencing of an event (e.g., Rubin, 2006). Various the-
orists argue that memories contain key components that
lead to both a sense of re-experiencing the event and a
belief that the event actually occurred (e.g., Brewer, 1996;
James, 1890/1950; Schacter, 1996; Tulving, 1985).
In recent years, this view has gained more attention,
with the distinction between belief and recollection
being supported by empirical research. For example, Sco-
boria et al. (2014) used structural equation modelling and
found that factors that predicted recollection (e.g., percep-
tion, re-experiencing) were distinct from factors that pre-
dicted belief (e.g., plausibility), suggesting a dissociation
between recollection and belief. For most of our memories,
belief and recollection both contribute to remembering.
Scoboria and Talarico (2013) found that for believed
autobiographical memories, belief and recollection
ratings both tend to be at the high end (above 7) on a
1–8 Likert scale.
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However, in other cases, only belief or recollection is
present. For example, there are family stories (e.g., your
birth) that one believes occurred but cannot recollect.
There are also NBMs where vivid recollections of events
exist (e.g., believing you actually saw Santa Claus putting
presents under the tree as a child) but beliefs for these
events are undermined (e.g., by acquiring knowledge
that Santa Claus is a fictional character) (Mazzoni et al.,
2010; Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014).
An examination of NBMs may help uncover how belief
and recollection interactively lead to behavioural out-
comes. For instance, in studies investigating how believed
memories impact behaviour, participants exhibited
superior public-speaking performance and higher levels
of exercise if believed memories of relevant positive experi-
ences were activated (see Biondolillo & Pillemer, 2015;
Pezdek & Salim, 2011). However, because these “mem-
ories” were both believed and recollected, it is hard to
know whether it was recollection, belief, or both that
were responsible for the changes in subsequent behaviour.
Research concerning false memories has also examined
the impact of belief on behaviour. For example, Bernstein
and Loftus (2009) reviewed a number of studies where
researchers created false memories about childhood
events, such as being ill after eating egg-salad. These mem-
ories resulted in a subsequent reduction in eating egg-
salad. Again, however, it is hard to determine the source
of change in subsequent behaviour as belief and recollec-
tion were confounded. That is, participants developed a
false belief about the false memory (event) with approxi-
mately a quarter of participants reporting having recollec-
tions of the false event (also see, Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry, &
Bernstein, 2012). Indeed, these authors were acutely aware
of this problem as Laney, Morris, Bernstein, Wakefield, and
Loftus (2008, p. 291) noted that,
the data in the present paper represent some false memories
and some false beliefs. But because it is awkward to say ‘false
memories and false beliefs’ repeatedly, we generally just use
one term (either “false memory” or “false belief”) to encompass
the notion of planting a false entity.
To our knowledge, there is no research that has directly
and experimentally tested whether it is false belief or
false recollection that affects behaviour (but see Otgaar,
Moldoveanu, Wang, & Howe, 2016). Recently, Bernstein,
Scoboria, and Arnold (2015) conducted a mega-analysis
on previously published food-preference experiments
(see above) and concluded that for false events, belief is
more important than memory in modifying food prefer-
ence. Indeed, they stated that, “[c]ompared to memory of
past events, belief in the occurrence of past events is
more important for altering attitudes and behaviors”
(p. 6). However, in all the experiments reviewed, belief
and recollection for the suggested false events were
neither intentionally nor clearly manipulated separately.
Moreover, NBMs were not addressed in any of the exper-
iments. Perhaps more importantly, food preferences may
result in part from decision-making processes that are
analytic and occur consciously. For instance, participants
might reason: “Since egg-salad made me ill, I’d better not
eat it.” However, in a problem-solving process that involves
intuitive thinking or “Aha!” experiences (e.g., insight-based
problem-solving; Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios,
2005; Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, & Ball, 2010), there is usually
no explicit reasoning about facts/knowledge. Recollection
might play a vital role independent of belief in insight-
based problem-solving behaviour where people are
unaware of the processes underlying the solutions to
these types of problems.
The current experiments
The main purpose of the current experiments is to examine
the impact of NBMs on insight-based problem-solving
behaviour. We decided not to use the food preference
paradigm to elicit false beliefs/memories because this para-
digm only allows one false belief or false memory to be
created per participant. Because so few false beliefs and
memories are created, it is even more difficult to produce
the necessary number of NBMs. Therefore, we opted for
a method that leads to high and reliable levels of false
memories, the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) para-
digm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In this
paradigm, participants are presented with lists of associ-
ated words (e.g., butter, food, eat, sandwich) that are all
related to a non-presented critical lure (i.e., bread). Partici-
pants not only correctly remember (recall, recognise)
items presented on the lists but also form false memories
for critical lures that were not presented. In the present
experiments, after false memories were formed with the
DRM paradigm, participants were challenged on their
responses by telling them certain items were not pre-
sented in an attempt to create nonbelieved false mem-
ories. Data from our lab (Otgaar et al., 2016) have
confirmed that nonbelieved false memories can be
created using the DRM paradigm. Also by using this para-
digm, we were able to examine the impact of beliefs on
true memory and explore the effects of nonbelieved true
memories on behaviour.
Following the challenges to true and false memories,
participants were asked to solve compound remote
associate task (CRAT) problems, in which solutions
referred to nonbelieved and believed words (true and
false memories from DRM lists). A CRAT problem consists
of three words (e.g., Board/Mail/Magic). To solve the
problem, participants have to come up with a word that
could link all the three words (in the example given
above, the answer was Black). Howe et al. (2010) pre-
sented participants with DRM lists and then asked partici-
pants to solve CRAT problems whose solutions were
critical lures for the DRM lists. They found that CRAT pro-
blems primed by false memories for critical lures were
solved more frequently and significantly faster than pro-
blems that were not primed. Subsequent research
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typically showed the priming effect of believed false
memories on CRAT problems (Howe, Garner, Charles-
worth, & Knott, 2011; Howe, Wilkinson, Garner, & Ball,
2016); and found that the priming effect of false mem-
ories was similar to or even stronger than that observed
for true memories (Howe, Threadgold, Norbury, Garner,
& Ball, 2013; Howe, Wilkinson, Monaghan, Ball, & Garner,
2013). Based on Bernstein et al.’s work (2015), we pre-
dicted that if belief is more influential than recollection
when it comes to impacting subsequent behaviours that
ostensibly require non-conscious problem-solving pro-
cesses, no priming effect would be found after beliefs
for false memories are withdrawn. However, if recollection
plays a more vital role in priming the CRATs than beliefs,
then nonbelieved false memories should prime as many
CRATs as believed false memories.
We were also interested in exploring individual differ-
ences in the formation of NBMs. Social feedback has
been found to be one of the main contributors to fostering
NBMs (Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2015) and hence we
included the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (Gudjonsson,
1989) in order to examine individual differences in social
compliance. Furthermore, a scale measuring dissociative
symptoms was administered because dissociation has fre-
quently been linked to the formation of false memories
(Giesbrecht, Lynn, Lilienfeld, & Merckelbach, 2008).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Before the recruitment of participants, we ran a power
analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007), with an estimated power of 0.80 and a
medium effect size of 0.25 ( f ). The power analysis revealed
that 34 participants needed to be tested. A total of 36 stu-
dents from Maastricht University participated in the exper-
iment in exchange for credit points or a financial reward of
€7.50. Two participants were excluded because they did
not complete the CRAT problem-solving session, thus
leaving 34 participants (14 males and 20 females). All par-
ticipants were native English speakers, aged between 17
and 34 (Mage = 21.6, SD = 3.26). The experiment was
approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty of Psy-
chology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University.
Materials
DRM lists. Sixteen DRM lists were used in our experiment.
These lists have successfully been used in previous
research (e.g., Howe, Garner, & Patel, 2013). Each DRM list
included 12 associated words (e.g., butter, food, eat, sand-
wich) and these words are all related to a non-presented
target or “critical lure” (i.e., bread). Importantly, to eliminate
possible item effects arising from differences between a
studied item and a critical lure, for eight lists the first list
word was replaced by the critical lure (see also Howe
et al., 2013). Thus, these “critical lures” are no longer
“false” memories as they now become “true” studied
items presented as part of the list. The other eight lists
were standard DRM lists that had the corresponding
eight critical lures. The recognition task contained 56
words, of which 24 items were presented items from the
DRM lists, 8 were non-presented critical lures from the
DRM lists, and 24 words were not presented and served
as unrelated lures.
CRAT problems. We used 24 CRAT problems in this
experiment (taken from Howe et al., 2013). Each CRAT
was composed of three words (e.g., crust, stale, French),
all of which could be solved by a single linking word (i.e.,
bread). Sixteen CRATs were primed by the preceding 16
DRM lists: half of the CRAT problems were primed by lists
whose false memories (critical lures) were the solution
words and the other half were primed by lists whose true
memories (studied items) were the solution words (see
Appendix). The other eight CRATs were not primed and
served as an unprimed control condition. The mean sol-
ution rate and solution time for each CRAT were known
from previous research (Howe et al., 2013). Figure 1 illus-
trates the alignment of DRM items and CRAT problems.
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989).
The GCS is a self-report questionnaire measuring the
degree of compliance. It contains 20 true/false statements
(e.g., “I often give in to people when I am under pressure”).
The total score of GCS ranges from 0 to 20, with higher
scores indicating more compliant tendencies. The CGS
has an internal consistency of 0.71 and a test–retest
reliability coefficient of 0.88.
Figure 1. Diagram of alignment between DRM items and CRAT problems.
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Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam,
1986). The DES measures the degree to which people
experience dissociative symptoms. It consists of 28 items
(e.g., “Some people find that sometimes they are listening
to someone talk and they suddenly realize that they did
not hear part or all of what was said.”) and participants
have to select what percentage of time this happens to
them from 0% to 100% with 10% increments. It has a
good internal consistency, with Cronbach’s α = .92.
Design and procedure
A 3 (memory type: critical lures, studied items, unrelated
items) × 2 (belief: challenged vs. control) within-subject
design was used. Participants were tested individually for
approximately 50 minutes in lab facilities at the faculty.
There were four phases.
(1) Study phase: DRM words were presented to partici-
pants on a computer screen. Participants were instructed
to remember as many words as they could. Each word
was visually presented for 1500 ms, with 500 ms inter-
stimulus interval using the program Visual Basic. The
sequence of the words within a list was fixed, but the
order of the lists was randomised.
(2) Recognition phase: After a distractor task (playing the
game Bejeweled for 3 min), participants were involved in a
recognition task, in which 8 critical lures, 24 studied words,
and 24 unrelated words were included to examine false
memories and true memories. Participants were asked to
identify the word on the screen as to whether it had
been presented by clicking on a “Yes” or “No” button.
Next, participants completed the dissociation question-
naire (DES) before they moved to the challenging phase
(see below).
(3) Challenging phase: Participants were told that the
computer graded their answers and gave them feedback
on their performance on the previous recognition test.
Before their responses were challenged, participants were
told why our memories were sometimes unreliable and
they were shown an extra DRM list to illustrate how a
DRM list could lead to the formation of false memories.
This explanation was given so participants understood
why feedback was presented.
In the challenged belief condition, when a certain target
word (e.g., bread) appeared on the screen, a label beneath
the word popped up stating that “Sorry, your previous
answer was incorrect. This word was not presented.” In
the control condition, the feedback was “Congratulations,
your answer was correct. This word was presented.” In
this way, we attempted to create nonbelieved and believed
memories. When the feedback was provided, the exper-
imenter showed participants a printed fake proof where
presented words were listed and gave oral social feedback
asking them to rethink their previous answer. Then
immediately after the challenge for each word, participants
rated their memory and belief for that word on 1–8 Likert
scales (i.e., “Do you have a memory for this word?”, 1 = no
memory at all, 8 = clear and complete memory; “Do you
believe that this word was presented to you?”, 1 = defi-
nitely did not happen, 8 = definitely did happen; adapted
from Scoboria et al., 2004). The experimenter explained
thoroughly to the participant the difference between
memory (i.e., recollection) and belief. The sequence of all
challenged words was randomised. In total, 56 words
from the recognition test were given feedback, but we
were only interested in the 24 target words that served
as solutions to the corresponding CRAT problems. The
belief in half of the target words (4 critical lures, 4
studied words, and 4 unrelated) was always challenged
regardless of their original recognition responses. The
other words were in the control condition in which partici-
pants’ belief in their presence was not challenged.
(4) Problem-solving phase: Twenty-four CRAT problems
were presented in which the correct answers were the
target words in the challenging phase. The 24 CRATs
were assigned to six (3 × 2) conditions. An ANOVA revealed
no statistically significant differences between mean sol-
ution rates across different item types (F(2, 18) = 0.01; p
= .99) and different belief conditions (F(1, 18) = 0.001; p
= .97). There were no solution time differences across
item types (F(2, 18) = 0.02; p = .98) and belief conditions
(F(1, 18) = 0.16; p = .70). These analyses were done as a
manipulation check to make sure that there was no base-
line difference in reaction times and solution rates
among clusters of CRATs across conditions.
Participants were falsely told that the problem-solving
phase was a separate experiment aimed at examining
how personality (i.e., the dissociation questionnaire)
affected problem-solving style. Participants were
instructed that three words would be presented on the
screen and their task was to come up with a word that
could link all the three words. Participants were given an
example first (e.g., the answer to the problem apple/
family/house was tree), followed by one practice CRAT
problem that they had completed themselves before
they began the test CRATs. Problems were presented in a
random order. A countdown timer appeared in the upper
right corner of the screen and participants were asked to
type their solution within 60 seconds. Upon completion
of each CRAT, no correct answer was given to lower the
risk that participants would connect the memory task
with the problem-solving task. Solution rates and times
were recorded by the computer. After all sessions, partici-
pants filled in the compliance scale (GCS) and were
debriefed about the purpose of the study.
Results and discussion
Recognition rates
The mean recognition rate for all studied items was 74.50%
(N = 608). The mean false recognition rate for critical lures
was 69.13% (N = 188), which is consistent with previous
research (e.g., Blair, Lenton, & Hastie, 2002). Participants
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falsely recognised 14.63% (N = 20) of non-presented unre-
lated items.
The mean recognition rate in each condition is shown in
Table 1. Recognition rates were analysed using a 3
(memory type: critical lures, studied items, unrelated
items) × 2 (belief: challenged vs. control) repeated
measures ANOVA. No interaction was found, F(2, 66) =
1.57, p = .22, partial η2 = .05. There was a main effect of
memory type, F(2, 66) = 185.51, p < .001, partial η2 = .85,
where Bonferroni’s post hoc analyses showed that partici-
pants recognised statistically more critical lures and
studied words than non-presented words (ps < .001).
There was no main effect of belief, F(1, 33) = 0.91, p = .35,
partial η2 = .03, indicating that there were an equivalent
number of true and false memories in both the challenged
belief and control conditions.
Nonbelieved and believed memories
We recorded memory and belief ratings for each word after
the challenge manipulation. Analogous to previous
research, we employed the following criteria for NBMs:
recollection needed to be rated at least 2 scale points
higher than belief (see Mazzoni, Clark, & Nash, 2014;
Otgaar et al., 2016), and within this criterion, the recollection
rating should be at least 3. For believed memories, we set
the same criterion for recollection rating (at least 3) as in
NBMs, and belief rating should be equal to, or above,
3. Within the categories of nonbelieved and believed mem-
ories, if the item was a critical lure, it was a false memory; if it
was a studied item, it was a true memory. For unrelated
items, there were two categories: items with no belief and
no memory (ratings ≤2) and items with no memory but
belief. Table 2 shows the mean memory and belief ratings
for words in each condition.
After the challenge manipulation, 97.1% of the partici-
pants (n = 33) had formed at least one nonbelieved true
memory for studied items, with an average number of
3.15 (SD = 1.05) NBMs. In all, 79.4% of the participants (n
= 27) had developed at least one nonbelieved false
memory, with an average number of 2.24 (SD = 1.52). In
the challenged belief condition, participants formed non-
believed false memories for 55.88% of the critical lures
and formed nonbelieved true memories for 78.68% of
the studied words. In the control condition, participants
formed believed false memories for 91.18% of the critical
items and formed believed true memories for 89.71% of
the studied words.
Solution rates of CRATs
The mean CRAT solution rates (in proportions) were calcu-
lated for each participant. We focused on words that were
effectively manipulated into believed/NBMs. We labelled
the effect of successfully challenging or lowering partici-
pants’ beliefs as “undermining”. Seven participants had
formed either zero nonbelieved false memories or zero
nonbelieved true memories; hence, the CRAT solution
rates of these cases were treated as missing values.
However, these participants had CRAT solution values in
the believed memory conditions, thus we used a multiple
imputation method (Schafer, 1997) to impute missing
data values. In total, 3.9% of the data (8 out of 204 cells)
were imputed over 5 cycles of imputations. We compared
the CRAT solution rates in the undermining belief con-
dition with the CRAT solution rate in the control condition
for the following three memory types: critical lures, studied
items, and unrelated items.1 Interestingly, undermining
belief led to different results for false and true memories.
Table 1. Recognition rates in different memory type and belief conditions
(M, 95%CI).
Memory type
Critical lures Studied items Unrelated items
Challenged belief 0.68
[0.57, 0.80]
0.88
[0.82, 0.93]
0.10
[0.06, 0.15]
Control condition 0.70 0.85 0.19
[0.60, 0.80] [0.77, 0.92] [0.11, 0.27]
Table 2. Mean memory and belief ratings in each kind of induced memory (CI: confidence interval; n: number of participants contributing to
the mean score; N: number of items contributing to the mean score).
Memory rating (95% CI) Belief rating (95%CI) Memory-belief
Nonbelieved false memory 5.02
[4.61, 5.44]
(n = 27; N = 76)
1.42
[1.12, 1.71]
(n = 27; N = 76)
3.60
Nonbelieved true memory 5.75
[5.33, 6.17]
(n = 33; N = 107)
1.96
[1.64, 2.28]
(n = 33; N = 107)
3.79
No belief no memory 1.27
[1.13, 1.40]
(n = 33; N = 121)
1.23
[1.09, 1.38]
(n = 33; N = 121)
0.04
Believed false memory 6.46
[5.97, 6.94]
(n = 34; N = 124)
7.25
[6.92, 7.59]
(n = 34; N = 124)
−0.79
Believed true memory 7.09
[6.81, 7.36]
(n = 34; N = 122)
7.59
[7.41, 7.78]
(n = 34; N = 122)
−0.50
Belief with no Memory 1.94
[1.62, 2.26]
(n = 30; N = 93)
6.36
[5.85, 6.86]
(n = 30; N = 93)
−4.42
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In the critical lures condition, undermining belief (M = 0.36,
SD = 0.29) led to statistically lower solution rates than
control (M = 0.49, SD = 0.28), t =−2.04, dfpooled = 884, p
= .04. However, for studied items, undermining belief
increased solution rates significantly (undermining belief,
M = 0.52, SD = 0.27; control condition, M = 0.40, SD = 0.25,
t = 2.04, dfpooled = 3353, p = .04; see Figure 2). We compared
the CRAT solution rates in the control condition to see
whether the results in the control condition were consist-
ent with previous research. Paired samples t-tests
showed that false memories did not differ significantly
from true memories in priming the CRATs (p = .27); false
and true memories both primed more CRATs than unre-
lated items (p = .008; p = .02). Thus, the results in the
control condition replicate previous findings on the conse-
quences of false memories on problem-solving (e.g., Howe
et al., 2013).
As has been done in previous related work (e.g., Otgaar
et al., 2015), we also performed an additional analysis by
focusing only on the items that participants recognised
as “presented” in the recognition test. When words with
“yes (presented)” recognition responses only were
included in analysis, a similar interaction effect between
memory and belief was found, F(2, 64) = 5.36, p < .01,
partial η2 = .14. No main effect of belief was found, F(1,
32) = 0.35, p = .56. No main effect of memory was found,
F(2, 64) = 2.37, p = .10.
Solution times of CRATs
Mean solution times of CRATs (in seconds) in each con-
dition were calculated. We were particularly interested in
comparing the solution times between nonbelieved and
believed memories. In some cases, participants solved no
CRATs under the priming of (non)believed memories,
thus solution times in that condition were counted as
missing. In total, there were 19.11% (N = 39) of the cases
where solution times were missing. We conducted
several paired sample t-tests and again found decreasing
belief had different effects for false and true memories
(Figure 3). In the critical lures condition, nonbelieved
false memory (M = 17.75, SD = 9.07) primed problems as
fast as believed false memory (M = 14.47, SD = 7.16; p
= .27); however, in the studied items condition, undermin-
ing belief (M = 12.80, SD = 5.18) resulted in faster solution
Figure 2. Mean solution rates in different memory type and belief con-
ditions (Experiment 1). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3. Mean solution times in different memory type and belief con-
ditions (Experiment 1). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4. (a) illustrates solution rates primed by different memory types and belief conditions in the immediate group (Experiment 2). (b) illustrates results in
the one-week delay group. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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times to CRAT problems than in the control condition (M =
20.33, SD = 10.30; p = .003). Undermining belief (M = 15.33,
SD = 9.58) and control conditions (M = 18.28, SD = 12.15)
did not differ in solution times for unrelated items (p
= .77).2
Exploratory analysis
We conducted Pearson’s correlations between the scores
on the GCS and the different memories (believed true/
false memory; nonbelieved true/false memory). We found
a statistically significant correlation between GCS scores
and false recognition rates (r (32) = .38, p = .03): the
higher scores on the GCS, the higher false recognition
rates. No correlation between GCS scores and true recog-
nition rates was detected. As GCS scores measure compli-
ance, we expected that the more compliance participants
exhibited, the more NBMs they would report. However,
no statistically significant correlation was found between
GCS scores and the number of nonbelieved false memories
(r (32) = .31, p = .07).
Correlations between DES scores and different kinds of
memories were also analysed. We found a statistically sig-
nificant negative correlation between dissociative symp-
toms and true recognition rates (r (32) =−.44, p = .01).
Thus, participants scoring high on dissociation had worse
memories for presented words. No correlation was found
between DES scores and false recognition rates. Interest-
ingly, dissociation scores correlated negatively with the
number of nonbelieved unrelated items (r (32) =−.36, p
= .04) but not nonbelieved true memories (r (32) =−.08,
p = .64) or nonbelieved false memories (r (32) =−.01, p
= .94). Of course, we had a small sample size for executing
correlation analyses, so the results of these analyses should
be cautiously treated.
Experiment 1 examined the behavioural consequences
of belief and recollection. We found that in the control
condition, false memories primed the CRATs as efficiently
as true memories, a finding consistent with previous
research (Howe et al., 2010). Interestingly and for the
first time, our data also showed that, without belief, the
priming effect of false memories was changed under
the conditions tested. This is in line with research by
Bernstein et al. (2015). That is, when belief in false mem-
ories was withdrawn, participants solved fewer CRAT pro-
blems. This result constitutes the first experimental
attempt that shows that nonbelieved (false) memories
impact problem-solving behaviour and do so differently
than true memories.
Some might argue that believed false memories primed
more CRATs than nonbelieved false memories because a
higher number of believed false memories were created.
However, our data on the other memory types did not
support this idea. In the studied item condition, there
were more believed true memories induced, but believed
true memories did not prime more CRAT problems than
nonbelieved true memories. Others might argue that
memory for an event is different from memory for a
word and the implication of studying NBMs for words
might not be so illuminating. Indeed, an event consists of
multiple elements and usually a recollection of an event
contains more vivid details than a recollection of a word.
Hence, NBMs for events might exhibit greater behavioural
impact than NBMs for words.
Although our data suggest that for false memory, belief
might play an active role in problem-solving, our study is
still preliminary and needs replication. Furthermore, the
results of this experiment were somewhat limited
because of the following. First, in this experiment, there
were only four CRATs in each condition. When we
attempted to induce NBMs for the four solution words to
these CRATs, not all of the items could be successfully
transformed into NBMs. The average nonbelieved
memory rate of critical lures and studied items was in the
55–80% range. If there are more items in each condition,
more NBMs can be created and thus, the effects of
beliefs and recollections can be better investigated.
Second, the CRAT problems in each condition were fixed;
that is, they were not completely randomised for every par-
ticipant. Although the mean solution rates and times for
CRATs were counterbalanced across conditions, it is
unknown whether the difficulty of CRATs impacted our
results. In order to address these issues and thus, replicate
our results, we conducted an additional experiment.
In Experiment 2, we assigned more CRAT problems to
each condition and CRAT problems were no longer fixed
in each condition. Furthermore, having established the
immediate effect of undermining belief on problem-
solving, Experiment 2 explored the long-lasting effects
of NBMs on problem-solving behaviour. From a theoretical
perspective, this is important because previous studies
have found that the superior priming effect of false mem-
ories emerged particularly after a one-week delay while
the priming effect of true memories declined (Howe
et al., 2013). One possible explanation is that true mem-
ories decay faster than false memories because true mem-
ories are often other-generated (e.g., presented on a list by
the experimenter), whereas false memories tend to be
self-generated [i.e., occurring spontaneously and automati-
cally as a result of internal semantic activation (Howe,
Garner, Threadgold, & Ball, 2015)]. This pattern corre-
sponds to findings from previous studies on false mem-
ories and food preferences in which the behavioural
impact of belief could last for months (Bernstein &
Loftus, 2009). Furthermore, previous research has shown
that false beliefs can last up to four months (see Geraerts
et al., 2008; Laney, Fowler, Nelson, Bernstein, & Loftus,
2008) and experimentally evoked nonbelieved false mem-
ories endure for as long as a month (Otgaar, Scoboria, &
Smeets, 2013).
Because the behavioural effects of false beliefs may be
long-lasting and because belief is more easily manipulated
than memory, one could anticipate the following. If belief is
the more active agent in guiding behaviour than memory,
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then undermining belief should lead to behavioural effects
even after a delay. As belief is assumed to be part of knowl-
edge related to the self (e.g., Scoboria et al., 2004), the
enduring behavioural effects of belief would be especially
evident for false memories as they are the result of internal
associative activation and thus, self-generated. Hence, in
Experiment 2, half of the participants had to complete
the CRAT problem-solving task immediately and the
other half following a one-week delay.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
A power analysis indicated that 70 participants were
needed when a power of 0.80 and a medium effect size
of 0.27 ( f ) were estimated. A total of 71 participants
were tested in exchange for credit points or a financial
reward of €7.50. The sample consisted of 22 males and
49 females, with a mean age of 22.3 years old (SD =
5.97). 84.5% of the participants (n = 60) were native
English speakers, and 15.5% (n = 11) of the participants
were fluent in English, but used English as a second
language.
Materials
Twenty-four DRM lists were used in Experiment 2. Each list
contained 10 associates. The recognition phase included
12 non-presented critical lures from 12 of the DRM lists,
48 studied items (in which 12 were targeted items for
belief manipulation), and 36 unrelated items. Twenty-four
CRATs whose answers were 12 critical lures and 12
studied items (corresponding to the 24 DRM lists) were
used. The GCS and DES questionnaires were administered
to participants as well (see Experiment 1).
Design and procedure
A 2 (time interval: immediate vs. 1 week) × 2 (memory type:
critical lures vs. studied items) × 2 (belief: challenged vs.
control) mixed design was used, where the first factor
was between-subjects and the other two were within-
subject factors. Thirty-six participants were randomly allo-
cated to the immediate condition and 35 to the one-
week delay condition. Experiment 2 followed the same
procedure as Experiment 1, except that 35 of the partici-
pants did not finish the problem-solving phase immedi-
ately after the challenging phase, but instead, did so one
week later. Because the items in the challenged belief
and control belief conditions were fixed, we switched the
items in these two conditions for half of the participants
in each time interval group. That is, belief for the same
12 target words was undermined in around half of the par-
ticipants (n = 31), but belief for these words was not chal-
lenged in the other participants.
Results and discussion
Recognition rates
The mean recognition rate for unrelated items was 14.5%.
For the targeted studied items and critical lures (i.e., those
that served as the solutions to the subsequent 24 CRATs),
the mean recognition rates in each condition are shown
in Table 3.
Nonbelieved and believed memories
Memory and belief ratings for each word were recorded
after the belief manipulation for that word. The same cri-
teria for nonbelieved and believed memories used in
Experiment 1 were used here. Table 4 shows the mean per-
centages of critical lures and studied items that were non-
believed and believed memories.
Solution rates of CRATs
Again, we labelled the effect of successfully challenging or
lowering participants’ beliefs as “undermining”. A 2 (time
interval: immediate vs. 1 week) × 2 (memory type: critical
lures vs. studied items) × 2 (belief: undermining vs.
control) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, with
time interval as a between-subjects variable. Note that
there were 14 participants in total who did not form a non-
believed true or a nonbelieved false memory. These partici-
pants’ CRAT data were not entered into the analysis. As a
result, 34 participants were in the immediate condition
and 23 were in the delay condition. There was no statisti-
cally significant three-way interaction effect for time inter-
val × memory type × belief, F(1, 55) = 0.14, p = .71, and also
no statistically significant two-way interactions. There was
a main effect for belief, F(1, 55) = 20.68, p < .001, partial
η2 = .27, which, like Experiment 1, showed that undermin-
ing belief resulted in lower solution rates. There was no
Table 3. Mean recognition rates for critical lures and studied items in
different conditions (N: number of recognised items).
Critical lures Studied items
Immediate Challenged belief 69.0% (N = 149) 85.6% (N = 185)
Control condition 68.5% (N = 148) 81.5% (N = 176)
One-week delay Challenged belief 58.6% (N = 123) 81.4% (N = 171)
Control condition 62.9% (N = 132) 76.2% (N = 160)
Table 4. Percentages of critical lures and studied items that were
nonbelieved and believed memories in each condition.
Critical
lures
Studied
items
Immediate Challenged belief (nonbelieved
memories)
58.33%
(N = 126)
61.17%
(N = 132)
Control condition (believed
memories)
91.67%
(N = 198)
95.33%
(N = 206)
One-week
delay
Challenged belief (nonbelieved
memories)
45.23%
(N = 95)
48.09%
(N = 101)
Control condition (believed
memories)
84.28%
(N = 177)
87.62%
(N = 184)
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main effect for memory type, F(1, 55) = 1.37, p = .25, partial
η2 = .02. Neither was there a main effect for time interval, F
(1, 55) = 0.44, p = .51, partial η2 = .008 (Figure 4).
The above analysis is based on using the filtering cri-
terion of NBMs having memory ratings that were at least
two points higher than belief ratings. When we adopted
the criterion of memory ratings being at least three
points higher than belief ratings, a statistically significant
main effect of belief was detected as well, F(1, 55) =
44.10, p < .001, partial η2 = .45. As in Experiment 1, we per-
formed an additional analysis by focusing on the items that
participants recognised as “presented” in the recognition
test. Even when only the recognition responses with “Yes
(presented)” were included, a statistically significant main
effect of belief was found, F(1, 67) = 18.70, p < .001,
partial η2 = .21, showing that undermining belief led to
less efficient problem-solving behaviour. No main effect
of memory type was found, F(1, 67) = 1.25, p = .26. There
was no significant main effect of time interval, F(1, 67) =
0.003, p = .96 and no statistically significant interactions
were detected.3
To rule out the possibility that the effect of belief was
due to the difficulty of the CRATs, we changed the CRAT
problems in the undermining belief and control conditions
in around half (45.1%, n = 32) of the participants. We split
the data into two groups in which participants received
the opposite belief manipulation for the same materials.
For instance, in one group, belief for “bread” was under-
mined and then participants solved a corresponding
CRAT; in the other group, belief for “bread” was confirmed
and participants solved the same CRAT. We conducted a 2
(change: yes vs. no) × 2 (memory type: critical lures vs.
studied items) × 2 (belief: undermining vs. control)
repeated measures ANOVA, with change as a between-
subject variable. No significant main effect of change was
found, F(1, 55) = 2.44, p = .12, indicating that the materials
did not impact our results.
Solution times of CRATs
We were also interested in whether undermining belief
would impact CRAT solution times. For critical items, we
conducted a 2 (time interval: immediate vs. one-week
delay) × 2 (belief: undermining vs. control) repeated
measures ANOVA, with the first variable being between-
subjects. Like Experiment 1, when participants solved no
CRAT under the priming of (non)believed memories, no
solution time data in that condition could be analysed.
There were 37 participants’ solution time data that could
be used. There was no main effect of belief, F(1, 36) =
0.45, p = .51, time interval, F(1, 36) = 0.28, p = .60, or inter-
action effect, F(1, 36) = 1.34, p = .25. For studied items, we
conducted the same analysis. We found no main effects
of time interval or belief. Thus, CRAT solution times for
false and true memories were not impacted by belief and
time interval.
Exploratory analysis
We found no statistically significant correlation between
compliance scores and the number of NBMs (r (69) = .04,
p = .73), which is consistent with Experiment 1. The data
from both experiments suggest that compliance does
not impact the formation of NBMs. Correlations between
dissociative symptoms and the number of true/false
believed and NBMs were analysed. We found no significant
correlation between dissociative symptoms and true rec-
ognition rates (r (69) =−.21, p = .08), and also no significant
correlation between dissociation and false recognition rate
(r (69) =−.20, p = .09) emerged. No correlation was found
between DES scores and the overall number of NBMs (r
(69) = .07, p = .59).
Consistent with Experiment 1, we found that undermin-
ing belief in false memories led to fewer CRAT problems
being solved than the control condition. Belief is conceptu-
alised as the truth value of an event. Even though a CRAT is
an insight-based problem-solving task, retracting belief in
false memories impacts the ability of false memories to
prime CRATs. The results on false memories from Exper-
iment 1 and Experiment 2 align with Bernstein et al.’s
(2015) conclusion that false autobiographical beliefs, not
memories, alter behavioural performance.
What we also found was that undermining belief in true
memories resulted in lower CRAT solution rates. In Exper-
iment 1, we did not find this. The reason might be that
we made several improvements in Experiment 2, such as
including more CRATs in each condition, and assigning
the CRATs to each condition in a more balanced way. In
addition, in Experiment 2 we found no statistically signifi-
cant results on CRAT solution times. The main reason for
this might be that there was limited data on the solution
times for CRATs. Only when participants solved at least
one CRAT problem could we obtain solution time data.
This can be resolved in future studies by using easier
CRAT problems. Also, our results showed that the deleter-
ious effects of belief retraction on problem-solving
occurred both immediately and after one week. This
shows that when belief is undermined, it does not have a
short-lived effect, but it endures over time. This is line
with research by Otgaar et al. (2013) who showed that
NBMs can last for a month.
General discussion
The current experiments serve as the first attempt to sim-
ultaneously assess the behavioural consequences of non-
believed and believed memories on problem-solving
behaviour. We found evidence across two experiments
that NBMs impacted problem-solving behaviour under
the conditions tested. The most intriguing finding was
that undermining belief in false memories led to less effi-
cient problem-solving behaviour. This result persisted
even after a one-week delay. To our knowledge, this is
the first experimental demonstration that for false
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memories, retracting belief adversely affects subsequent
behaviour.
This novel finding implies that belief contributed more to
the behavioural performance on the CRATs than recollec-
tion. This is in line with previous research suggesting
belief in the occurrence of past events was more important
in determining eating behaviour than recollection (Bernstein
et al., 2015). However, in this work, no experimental test was
performed to manipulate belief separately and examine
whether this would impact behaviour. Our study is the
first showing the consequences of belief and recollection
on behaviour by using a non-inferential, and perhaps
more automatic, insight-based problem-solving task.
Our findings have several theoretical implications. The
data on NBMs support the distinction between belief and
recollection. The distinction between belief and recollec-
tion was not made in the memory literature until recently
(e.g., Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; Otgaar et al., 2015; Scoboria
et al., 2004; Scoboria et al., 2014). Previous studies mostly
showed dissociation of belief and recollection for autobio-
graphical events. For instance, research has shown that
belief in actions (e.g., clapping hands) could be under-
mined while the recollected aspect of the actions
remained intact (Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 2012;
Mazzoni et al., 2014). Also, experiments showed that
belief in experiencing a hot balloon ride can be manipu-
lated while recollection of the event remained intact
(Otgaar et al., 2013). In our two experiments, we under-
mined belief for associatively related words and recorded
belief and memory ratings afterwards. We found that for
both false and true memories, belief ratings dropped
while memory/recollection ratings were high after under-
mining belief.
Scoboria et al. (2014) proposed a theoretical model to
explain the relationship between belief and memory (recol-
lection). In this model, autobiographical belief and recollec-
tion are two independent continuous dimensions that
result in different categories such as believed memories
and NBMs. Our experiments support this view inasmuch
as we successfully manipulated participants’ beliefs while
recollections were retained. Based on the independence
of these two components, it is proposed that belief in
the occurrence of an event, rather than a specific
memory for the event, is highly malleable and is the critical
component in influencing behaviour (Bernstein et al., 2015;
Scoboria et al., 2014). Importantly, we found that for
false memories, undermining belief led to a reduction
in subsequent problem-solving behaviour, a finding that
accords well with the above proposition. As belief in occur-
rence is based in various inputs, just one of which is recol-
lection, theories that focus on episodic recollection alone
may not be the best predictors of behaviour.
In Experiment 2, we found evidence that for truememory
as well, problem-solving was more difficult when belief was
undermined. This suggests that for memory in general,
behaviour is predominantly influenced by believing the
event rather than recollecting the event. It is unclear why
we did not find this effect in Experiment 1. Although one
might expect that challenging truememories ismoredifficult
than falsememories (e.g., Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, &Merckel-
bach, 2010), this is not what we found in the present exper-
iments. Here, both nonbelieved true and false memories
were evoked, something that might be related to the fact
that the DRM procedure leads both to high levels of true
and false recognition, with false recognition rates often not
differing from true recognition rates (Roediger &McDermott,
1995). Of course, future research should examine more
closely whether belief is also important in guiding behaviour
for true memory.
Associative-activation theory (AAT, Howe, Wimmer,
Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Otgaar, Howe, Peters,
Smeets, & Moritz, 2014) as well as the activation-monitor-
ing theory (Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001) provide
explanations for the priming effects of false memories.
AAT suggests that processing of one concept activates a
corresponding node and this activation spreads automati-
cally to nearby associative concept nodes. When DRM list
items are presented and encoded, their activation
spreads to non-presented, but related items (i.e., the critical
lure) resulting in false memories. Because false memories
are highly associated with true memories, they often
exert a similar priming effect on CRAT problems (Howe
et al., 2013). In our experiments, we manipulated partici-
pants’ beliefs for the items after false and true memories
were formed, and we found a similar reduced priming
effect for both true and false memories (Experiment 2).
One possibility might be that undermining belief adversely
affects spreading activation in one’s knowledge base,
thereby reducing its effects on subsequent tasks including
the spreading activation required to solve CRATs. Of
course, further investigation is needed to examine the
precise mechanism by which belief and recollection can
impact problem-solving behaviour.
One might argue that the manipulation of belief in our
experiments might have changed the automatic nature of
the priming process. In Experiment 2, the data showed that
the CRAT solution rates primed by true memories still
remained high even after a one-week interval, but previous
research has found that these rates dropped after a one-
week delay (Howe et al., 2013). Priming CRATs in prior
research is considered to occur automatically by associative
activation (Howeet al., 2010). Queryingbelief (e.g., undermin-
ing) in the current experiments may havemade the recollec-
tions of true and false items more conscious and salient,
which may have fundamentally changed the priming
process. However, if we look at the data of the control con-
dition in the immediate testing group, we found the exact
same result with previous studies (solution rates: critical
lures ≥ studied items > unrelated items), and in the immedi-
ate group, belief was also queried in the control condition.
This suggests that our belief manipulation might not have
affected the automatic nature of our priming effects.
Our study also explored the relationship between
compliance and NBMs. Both experiments demonstrated
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no statistical link between compliance scores and the
number of NBMs. Scoboria, Boucher, et al. (2015) found
that the primary reason people retracted their belief in
a memory was social feedback, such as someone telling
you that your memory was not true. Our study found
that people who were more compliant did not form
more NBMs than people who were less compliant. One
reason for this is that social feedback is more related
to external pressure, such as suggestive information,
whereas compliance can be regarded as an internal per-
sonality characteristic. Our null result begs the question
whether the formation of NBMs might be more affected
by external factors such as who provides social feedback
(e.g., authority or stranger).
One might object that our memory task is related to the
problem-solving task and that this is a potential confound
in our experiments. However, in food preference studies
(Bernstein & Loftus, 2009), participants created false
beliefs or memories towards a negative food experience
in the first session, and then the amount of that food
they ate was measured in the second session. Participants’
eating behaviour was measured weeks or months after the
first session (e.g., Geraerts et al., 2008; Scoboria et al., 2012).
They were told that the second session was a completely
irrelevant experiment as to reduce the chance that partici-
pants could link the two sessions with each other. Impor-
tantly, in the current experiments, we also told
participants that our problem-solving task was an unre-
lated task. By way of confirmation that our manipulation
succeeded, we interviewed some participants after the
experiments and none of them could see the link
between the memory task and the problem-solving task.
To conclude, our experiments provide the first evidence
that for false memories, problem-solving was hampered
when belief was reduced. This shows that belief is the
most active agent in impacting problem-solving behaviour.
Indeed, our experiments reveal novel evidence that belief
and recollection have distinct behavioural consequences.
The time has now come to extend this finding and investi-
gate whether such differential consequences might also
appear in other situations.
Notes
1. In this analysis, words were evaluated as NBMs when memory
ratings for them were two points higher than belief ratings.
When we adopted a stricter criterion (i.e. memory ratings
were at least three points higher than belief ratings), we
found a same interactive pattern and the true memory effect
was less pronounced (see supplementary document).
2. The pattern of results was basically similar when a three-point
criterion (i.e. memory recollection was rated at least three
points higher than belief) for NBMs was adopted.
3. We examined whether being native English speaker or not
would impact the results. When non-native English speakers
were excluded, there were 29 participants in the immediate
group and 17 participants in the delay group and the result
pattern was not changed by the exclusion.
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Appendix. Examples of DRM lists and CRAT problems
Critical lures Black Bread Car Needle Fruit Shirt
white butter truck thread apple Blouse
dark Food bus pin vegetable sleeves
charred Eat automobile eye orange pants
night sandwich vehicle sewing kiwi tie
funeral Rye drive sharp citrus button
colour Jam jeep point ripe shorts
grief Milk Ford prick pear iron
death flour keys thimble banana polo
ink Jelly garage haystack berry collar
coal dough highway thorn cherry vest
brown crust van injection basket pocket
grey Slice taxi syringe juice jersey
Associated
CRAT
Board/mail/
magic
Crust/stale/
french
Chase/police/
toy
Knitting/pine/
work
Salad/bowl/
juice
Football/flannel/
vest
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